Introduction
There is a widespread view in the monetary business cycle literature that sticky price models need to be augmented with real rigidities in order to replicate the dynamic responses observed in the data. 1 A theory of real rigidity explains why real wages or real prices are unresponsive to changes in economic activity. Labor market search in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) may be one way of introducing real wage rigidity and has recently been embedded in sticky price models by a number of authors. But Krause and Lubik (2007) find that labor market search frictions do not induce real wage rigidity, which echoes the finding of Shimer (2005a) and that productivity increases are mostly absorbed by higher wages if those are determined as the outcome of Nash bargaining. Moreover, they report that imposing real wage rigidity only weakly affects real marginal cost and hence inflation. This surprising result arises because labor market search frictions generate a surplus from a match which gives rise to long-term employment relationships. The value of such a relationship to the firm drives a wedge between the real marginal cost and the real wage, and becomes more sensitive to demand shocks under exogenous real wage rigidity due to the larger share of the surplus that accrues to the firm. Therefore, their results suggest that search and matching frictions do not help explain the persistent effects of monetary shocks. This paper shows that if workers can search on the job, the response of real wages and the value of a long-term employment relationship to a monetary shock is dampened, such that onthe-job search induces rigidity of real marginal cost and acts as a strong propagation mechanism that results in a persistent output response. Job-to-job mobility is a quantitatively important phenomenon in U.S. labor markets. Moreover, it has the ability to propagate productivity shocks in real models as has been shown in a number of recent studies. 2 The paper studies a sticky price model economy with money in the utility function where the labor market is 1 Ball and Romer (1990) show that nominal rigidities can be explained by a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions. See also Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) , Dotsey and King (2005) , and Jeanne (1998). 2 Responding to Shimer's (2005a) criticism of the lack of propagation and the role of wage bargaining in real search and matching models a literature has ensued that aims at remedying this challenge. proposes a model of equilibrium wage stickiness on which some of the recent sticky price literature draws. Other research derives low wage volatility from fundamentals without invoking wage stickiness. One way of achieving this is by allowing for job-to-job transitions as is done by Krause and Lubik (2006) , Nagypal (2006) and Tasci (2006) . characterized by search frictions, job heterogeneity and job-to-job mobility. In particular, high wage and low wage jobs are created through a costly matching process and low wage workers search on the job for high wage jobs as in Krause and Lubik (2006) . Following an expansionary monetary shock, consumption demand increases which prompts increased vacancy posting.
As a result low wage workers raise their search intensity and increase the effective pool of searchers for high wage jobs, while unemployed searchers redirect their search efforts to low wage jobs. The increased search for both types of jobs prevents the labor market from tightening rapidly and thus dampens the increase in real wages. At the same time, the additional channel of employment growth provides a shift toward the more productive high wage jobs, which relaxes the economy's resource constraint. The combination of stronger employment growth and increased output per worker prevents the value of a long-term employment relationship in both types of jobs from rising rapidly. The combined effect is a smaller increase in real marginal cost.
Quantitative analysis of the model shows that on-the-job search substantially reduces the volatility of real wages, real marginal cost and inflation relative to output. As a result, output responds strongly to monetary shocks: several measures indicate that the propagation of monetary shocks is at least three times stronger than in a sticky price model without on-the-job search or in a model with a frictionless labor market. The latter two models yield quantitatively similar results. These findings emphasize that recent improvements in real models of labor market search, which concentrate on the volatility of real wages, do not necessarily imply an improvement for models with nominal rigidities. They do so only insofar the mechanism that underlies real wage stickiness also affects the real marginal cost.
Among related literature, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) study the role of labor market search frictions in a limited participation model of money, and Walsh (2003) introduces search frictions in a cash-in-advance model with sticky prices. Walsh (2005) finds that labor market search frictions strengthen the output and inflation persistence in a sticky price model with habit formation in consumption preferences and price indexation to the past inflation rate. These features can substantially influence the dynamic response of real marginal cost to a nominal demand shock, and therefore make the role of search frictions in determining real marginal cost difficult to assess. Trigari (2005) focuses on the role of the intensive and extensive margins to explain output and inflation dynamics, but adds the same inertial features to preferences and price adjustment. On the contrary, Krause and Lubik (2007) , discussed above, find that labor market search frictions influence the real effects of nominal price rigidity only weakly.
The paper proceeds as follows. A sticky price model with on-the-job search is presented and discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 the model is analyzed quantitatively and the results compared to those from two alternative sticky price models: one with search frictions but no on-the-job search, the other with a competitive labor market. Section 4 adds some concluding remarks.
A sticky price model with on-the-job search
The model economy is inhabited by four types of agents: households, final good producers, intermediate good producers, and a monetary authority. Each of these agents is discussed in turn.
Households
Each period the infinitely-lived representative household supplies one unit of labor inelastically, and chooses paths for consumption c t , real money balances M t /P t , and bond holdings B t that maximize its expected lifetime utility
subject to the budget constraint
where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, P t is the unit price of consumption, R t is the nominal interest rate, T t is a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority, and the disutility associated with work effort is normalized to zero. Real income D t consists of monopoly profits from the final good firms, rents related to labor market frictions from the intermediate good firms, either a wage w j t from employment in a type j job or unemployment income h when unemployed, minus a lump-sum transfer to finance unemployment income. 3 The different types of jobs are discussed below. Consumption consists of a composite of differentiated goods i ∈ [0, 1] defined 3 In order to avoid distributional issues, it is assumed that employed and unemployed households pool consumption. Equivalently, there could be perfect insurance markets, as in Andolfatto (1996) , or households could consist of a continuum of members pooling their income, as in Merz (1995) .
, where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between these goods. Cost minimization of the household's consumption across goods implies that the demand for each good is given by C t (i) = (P t (i)/P t ) − C t , while the aggregate price index is
. The household's choices for consumption, bond holdings and real money balances yield the following optimality conditions
Condition (2) is the consumption Euler equation and (3) specifies the household's money demand.
Final good producers
The final good market is characterized by monopolistic competition. There is a continuum of 
where z b t , z g t denotes the relative price of good b, g respectively, and z t is the real marginal cost of each final good firm, which is given by
Final good producers set the price of their product in order to maximize discounted expected real profits subject to demand from households and subject to Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) style price stickiness. Specifically, a fixed fraction ν ∈ (0, 1) of randomly chosen firms does not reoptimize price and instead adjusts it for steady state inflation π, while each remaining firm faces the problem
Here β t,t+k = β k (C t+k /C t ) −σ is the stochastic discount factor by which firms' expected profits are evaluated in terms of the value attached to them by the households. Profit maximization then requires the first order condition
to be satisfied. If prices are flexible (i.e. ν = 0), this condition reduces to z t /( − 1) = P * t /P t , which shows that /( − 1) is the desired markup of each intermediate good firm's price over its marginal cost. In the presence of price rigidity, the firm's actual markup will differ from but tend toward the desired markup. The aggregate price index must satisfy
Intermediate good producers
Intermediate good production takes place in two perfectly competitive markets. Heterogeneity results from the presence of two types of firms: those with high wage ("good") jobs and those with low wage ("bad") jobs. The cost of creating a job by any firm is represented by the flow cost of posting a vacancy: γ g for good jobs and γ b for bad jobs, where γ g > γ b . In the presence of search frictions these costs give rise to surpluses, which in turn lead to equilibrium wage differentials. A proportion ρ ∈ (0, 1) of existing matches is exogenously destroyed before production and matching start, and each surviving worker-firm pair produces a t units of output in period t, where a t is the aggregate state of productivity that evolves according to
Thus, aggregate production of good j = b, g is
where n j t is employment in a type j firm. Exogenous match destruction is consistent with the evidence of Hall (2006) and Shimer (2005b) that changes in the separation rate play only a minor role in explaining variations in the unemployment rate. The specification of the labor market follows Krause and Lubik (2006) .
Labor market. While high wage and low wage firms post vacancies, unemployed workers decide ex ante towards which type of job they direct their search effort. However, labor mobility implies that in equilibrium, the value to an unemployed worker of searching for either type of job must be equal in every period. The matching frictions of workers and firms are represented by a constant returns to scale matching function that determines the number of type j matches between job searchers and vacancies as
Here u j t is the measure of unemployed workers searching for type j jobs, v j t is the measure of type j vacancies, the scale parameter ψ reflects the efficiency of the matching process, and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the unemployment elasticity of matches. Thus, the evolution of employment in each type of job is described by the motion law
With a population size normalized to one, the total number of searchers is given by
where
, is a measure of the labor market tightness. The probability to fill a vacancy (the firm matching rate) is given by
and rises when the labor market becomes slack. Similarly, the probability to find a job (the worker matching rate) is
so that a worker is more likely to find a job when the labor market is tight.
Wage determination. The surplus from a match is divided between the worker and the firm via Nash bargaining. To determine a wage that gives the worker his share of the bargain, it is helpful to describe the asset values of matched and unmatched firms and households in a recursive form. The value of a matched type j firm, J j t , is the sum of the current real net revenue and the discounted present value of the firm in the next period
where w j t is the wage received by the worker and V j t is the value of an unmatched type j firm in period t. Such a firm pays the vacancy cost and is matched with probability q j t , such that
Free entry drives the asset value of unmatched firms to zero in equilibrium, and thus
The job creation conditions (17) relate the expected cost of filling a vacancy to the expected value of a match. Suppose, for instance, that the real interest rate falls following an expansionary monetary policy shock. The ensuing rise of the stochastic discount rate increases the discounted present value of a job, which stimulates vacancy posting until the firm matching rate has adjusted to eliminate the ex ante rents from an additional vacancy.
The value of an employed (unemployed) worker is the wage (unemployment income) plus the expected present value of this worker's employment status in the next period
The Nash bargaining outcome, through which the worker receives a share η ∈ (0, 1) of the surplus in each type of job, results in the wage equations
The worker is compensated for a fraction η of firm revenue and the saving of hiring cost which the firm enjoys thanks to the match. In addition, the worker is compensated for a fraction 1 − η of the forgone unemployment income.
The assumption that unemployed workers direct their search activity between the two types of jobs yields a restriction on the costs of job creation and on the matching rates of both types of jobs. Specifically, U g t = U b t in equilibrium because of arbitrage by unemployed workers, which in turn implies that labor market tightness for good and bad jobs is in fixed proportion
On-the-job search. Data suggest that job-to-job movements make up an important part of newly formed matches (Nagypal, 2004) . As such, they can potentially shed light on various questions about the labor market (see e.g. Pissarides, 1994 , and Burdett and Mortensen, 1998).
More recently, the role of on-the-job search has been studied in dealing with the issue raised by Shimer (2005a) that in a standard model of labor market search, productivity increases are mostly absorbed by higher wages and do not nearly result in the fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies that are observed in the data. Job-to-job mobility can amplify the increase in vacancy creation after a shock while putting less upward pressure on wages.
Such a mechanism is incorporated in the model of Nagypal (2006), where employers prefer to hire employed workers rather than unemployed because the former are less likely to quit the job and firms incur a training cost after a match is made. Tasci (2006) proposes a model of jobto-job flows that arise because of heterogeneity in match quality. The measure of low-quality matches rises during a boom, which gives rise to procyclical transitions from low quality to high quality jobs. Krause and Lubik (2006) propose an alternative mechanism to address the same issue. They use the labor market with job heterogeneity discussed above, where good jobs and bad jobs coexist due to a difference in the cost of vacancy creation. Workers in bad jobs search endogenously for good jobs, and increase their search effort in periods of high productivity because the increased availability of good job vacancies increases the worker matching rate.
The increased pool of search in turn encourages firms to post more vacancies, which leads to a gradual increase in labor market tightness and prevents real wages from rising rapidly. This paper follows Krause and Lubik (2006)'s approach to introduce job-to-job movements. 4 The introduction of on-the-job search changes some equations for good jobs and most equations for bad jobs. All workers in bad jobs search on the job with an endogenous search intensity s t (whereas the search intensity of unemployed workers is always equal to one). Hence, in period t, there are u g t + e t workers searching for good jobs, where
4 These authors also cite evidence that jobs created during recessions are of lower average quality and come from a lower part of the wage distribution than jobs created in booms, and that employment in high wage jobs in U.S. manufacturing is more procyclical than low wage jobs, which agrees with their model's predictions. Shimer (2005b) reports that the actual job-to-job transition rate is strongly procyclical.
is the effective search intensity. Thus, the matching function of good jobs is given by
and the worker matching rate for good jobs becomes
while the labor market tightness is adjusted correspondingly to θ
. The evolution of bad jobs becomes
To find the wage equation, the value of a matched firm with a bad job is
where the probability that the worker might quit reduces the continuation value of the match to the firm. The value of an unmatched firm with a vacancy for a bad job remains unchanged, so that free entry implies
The value of an employed worker with a bad job is
where k(s t ) denotes the cost of search, which is a strictly convex function of search intensity with k(0) = 0 and k (s t ), k (s t ) > 0. For a worker in a bad job, increasing search intensity is costly but makes finding a good job more likely. The value of an unemployed worker looking for a bad job remains unchanged. Thus, the bargaining outcome yields a wage equation for bad jobs
A higher search intensity has opposing effects on the wage. It tends to raise the wage in order to compensate the worker for the reduction of surplus due to a higher search cost. But it also tends to lower the wage to compensate the firm for the increased chance of separation due to the worker quitting. A worker in a bad job chooses his search intensity to maximize his asset value of the match, which yields the following condition
Thus, workers in bad jobs increase their search intensity if the worker matching rate for a good job rises or if firms' expected value of a good match increases relative to that of a bad match.
Monetary authority
The monetary authority is assumed to conduct its policy according to the following money growth rule
where µ t denotes the growth rate of the nominal money supply, M t , and µ is its steady state access to lump-sum taxes and conducts a Ricardian fiscal policy, so that the government budget constraint need not be specified.
Equilibrium and calibration
In equilibrium, market clearing implies that B t = B t−1 = 0 and M t = M t−1 + T t in each period t. Intermediate good market clearing requires that
and final good market clearing requires that
where The ensuing analysis uses a realistic calibration of model parameters to evaluate the model quantitatively. The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1 . The discount factor β is equal to 0.99, σ = 1, = 11 is chosen to yield the steady state markup of 1.1, the interest rate semielasticity of money demand is one, which is the low value considered by Dotsey and King 
Real wages and real marginal cost
Define the value of a long-term employment relationship to a firm as the difference between the asset value of a match available for current production and its discounted expected future value. 6 Equation (16) implies that in equilibrium this value is equal to the current real net revenue from an existing match. This is the revenue that an unmatched firm foregoes if a sudden increase in consumption demand cannot be met because it does not have a worker to increase production. For bad matches equation (24) implies that this value is further raised by the expected production loss arising from endogenous quits, or
Writing these equations in terms of the intermediate good relative prices, which determine the real marginal cost of final goods, shows that the value of a long-term employment relationship drives a wedge between the ratio of real wage and marginal labor product, and the relative price, 7
With a frictional labor market the value of a long-term relationship can display substantial cyclical behavior that causes the dynamics of real marginal cost to differ from that of real wages. 8 Intuitively, suppose that current consumption demand rises due to a temporary acceleration of the money growth rate. Then intermediate good firms must employ more labor in 6 The terminology "long-term employment relationship" follows Goodfriend and King (2001) in their description of most labor transactions in advanced economies.
7 Filling a vacancy is costless and instantaneous in the absence of labor market search frictions, and hence the value of a long-term relationship is zero. In that case, the current relative prices depend only on the current real wages as z j t = w j t /a t , j = b, g. Plugging this into equation (6) yields the familiar expression of real marginal cost as a weighted average of real factor prices over the marginal product of labor. 8 Goodfriend and King (2001) also discuss why the "effective" real marginal cost may be more volatile than the real wage because of long-term relationships between workers and firms.
order to meet the increased demand for final and hence intermediate goods, prompting these firms to post additional vacancies. The labor market tightens as a result and this pushes up wages. Although employment and production will expand with a lag, they cannot increase initially because the number of matches is predetermined. Because output is initially scarce relative to consumption demand, the current value of a match rises more than the discounted present value of a match. That is, the value of a long-term employment relationship rises and consequently the real marginal cost rises more sharply than the real wage. As Krause and Lubik (2007) show, imposing exogenous real wage rigidity would barely affect the dynamics of real marginal cost. This is because if wages are prevented to rise in the face of the nominal demand shock, the additional surplus generated by an existing match accrues entirely to the firm. Hence, the value of the long-term employment relationship to such a firm rises all the more strongly.
On the contrary, on-the-job search can result in a dampening of both the real wage and the value of a long-term relationship by opening up an additional channel of employment growth. Consider first how good job creation is affected. When workers can search on the job the increase in good vacancies posted after an expansionary money growth shock raises the worker matching rate for a good job and thereby induces workers in bad jobs to increase their search intensity for a higher value job. The increase in effective search for good jobs in turn stimulates the posting of more good job vacancies as it prevents the firms' matching rate from falling rapidly. Hence, employment growth is strengthened by an increased formation of good matches which takes place without a rapidly tightening labor market. As employment rises the real wage of good jobs is held down as an endogenous result of the subdued labor market tightness. The additional employment growth results in a shift to the more productive good jobs. Thus, while employment becomes relatively abundant via on-the-job search, the number of additional matches required to meet the growth in consumption demand is subdued. This implies that the rise in the value of a match is slowed by on-the-job search. And because job creation increases strongly at a given labor market tightness, the rise in the value of a long-term relationship is dampened as well.
At the same time, rising quits prompt firms to post more bad vacancies. As a result, unemployed workers redirect their search toward the bad sector until the value of both types of unemployed searchers is equalized. Hence, the labor market for bad jobs also experiences stronger employment growth without a rapidly tightening labor market. Hence, real wages and the value of a long-term employment relationship for bad jobs are rigid, even though the latter is raised on impact of a shock by the rise in quits during the boom as shown in equation (31) .
Thus, on-the-job search allows the creation of matches of both types of job to expand while preventing real wages and the value of a long-term relationship to rise rapidly. The net effect is that real marginal cost in the final good sector may be substantially less volatile in a model with job-to-job mobility, reducing the dependence on nominal price stickiness. The importance of these effects is evaluated quantitatively in the next section.
Quantitative analysis
This section discusses the quantitative evaluation of the sticky price model with on-the-job search (henceforth, OJS) and contrasts these results with those obtained from two alternative models. One is a sticky price model with a competitive labor market (henceforth, NK), where households have a convex disutility from supplying labor hours. This model consists of equations (A1)-(A6) in the Appendix after log-linearization, and the real marginal cost is determined by the competitive labor market equilibrium condition
where ζ −1 is the labor supply elasticity. The value of this elasticity has been a substantial source of controversy in the literature. In business cycle models, higher values are often chosen than those that are estimated in microeconomic studies. Here, an intermediate value is chosen by setting ζ = 2. The second is a model with labor market search and job heterogeneity but no on-the-job search (henceforth, DMP), which is obtained by setting the search intensity s t = 0 for all t. 9 3.1 Impulse response analysis Table 2 .
The increase in output persistence generated by on-the-job search is mirrored in the labor market by an amplified increase in vacancy creation and associated reduction of unemployment in comparison to the DMP model. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . Consequently, as the figure shows, on-the-job search results in an inflation response that is only about half as large as in the DMP model. Table 3 reports the average standard deviations of 500 histories simulated with the three models driven by money growth shocks and productivity shocks. These numbers can be com- The OJS model matches well the volatility of inflation, contrary to the alternative models for which inflation volatility is about twice as high. Correspondingly real wage volatility is much lower in the OJS model than in the alternatives even though it is still more than twice as large as its empirical counterpart. This reflects the volatility of real marginal cost across models, which is almost twice as large in the DMP model than in the OJS model. 11 The volatility of inflation relative to that of real marginal cost is much smaller in the models with search than in the NK model (about 1/5 compared to 1/2), consistent with the intuition that in the former, expected inflation during a boom is subdued by the expected expansion of production capacity from increased matching. The conclusions from comparison between models remain unchanged when the volatilities are generated conditional on money growth shocks alone, although these do not match well the unconditional volatilities of the data.
Simulation results
In the labor market, on-the-job search results in strongly increased vacancy and unem- Table 3 are close to those from the DMP model without real wage rigidity. Thus, the exogenous real wage rigidity is not effective in increasing the persistence of the output response to a nominal shock.
Concluding remarks
Allowing workers to search on the job in the presence of labor market search frictions improves the sticky price model in terms of amplification and propagation of monetary shocks, both in comparison to an associated search model without on-the-job search and compared to a model with a competitive labor market. With on-the-job search the contract multiplier and the cumulative output response to a monetary shock are at least three times larger than in these alternative models. The volatility of inflation corresponds closely to the U.S. data. Shutting down the possibility of on-the-job search retains the qualitative features of output dynamics but shows, consistent with the finding of Krause and Lubik (2007) , that this model is quantitatively similar to the case of a competitive labor market. 
